TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE by Fernando MIERZEJEWSKI & Katholieke Universiteit
Volume IV/ Issue 2(8)/ Summer 2009 
  261 
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE 
 
Fernando MIERZEJEWSKI 
Katholieke Universiteit, Belgium 




A general theory of liquidity is proposed. The major hypothesis advanced in the paper is that individuals 
do face borrowing restrictions in capital markets.  The value of  portfolios combining risky assets  and cash 
balances  is  then  related  to  the  price  assigned  in  some  market  of  deposit  insurance,  and  is  accordingly 
characterised  by  a  method  suggested  by  actuarial  researchers    and  commonly  used  by  insurers  and 
reinsurers. It is demonstrated that in this way, macroeconomics, financial economics and actuarial sciences fuse 
together in a unified theoretical framework, which can be applied as an alternative to the utility maximisation 
approach. Episodes of liquidity crises, which lack an explanation under classic economic theory, are meaningful 
within the new theoretical setting. 
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1. Introduction 
The  paradigm  of  perfect  competition  has  predominated  in  modern  financial  and  economic 
theory. In this setting, individuals can always borrow the funds required to carry out their consumption 
and investment projects. 
Most of the methods currently used to assess the price of investment portfolios are based on this 
assumption. At the macroeconomic level, the hypothesis supports the belief that financial institutions 
do efficiently allocate economic resources. 
The empirical evidence, however, suggests that borrowing restrictions are always present in 
capital markets. A new theoretical setting that explicitly incorporates this condition is proposed in this 
paper. 
 
2. Why a General Theory of Liquidity? 
The presence of borrowing restrictions implies that individuals are not indifferent about the 
amount of cash holdings to maintain in their portfolios. 
The problem is in the interest of private investors and financial conglomerates, for they are 
obliged to raise capital reserves in order to fix solvency requirements and to provide a guarantee to 
creditors and customers that they can honour their liabilities. It is also in the interest of insurers and 
reinsurers, who maintain cash provisions to execute the payments, promised in their issued policies. 
In  a  more  general  context,  the  problem  is  connected  to  the  preference  for  liquidity  of 
individuals, i.e. the amount of balances they are willing to keep in the form of currency  or simply, 
the money demand of the economy. 
When deciding the target interest rate (consistent with some predetermined levels of inflation 
and employment) and the corresponding money stock, central bankers must rely on estimations of the 
money demand  more precisely, they must rely on estimations of the interest rate elasticity of the 
money demand [see e.g. Blanchard, (2005), and Howells and Bain, (2005)]. Hence the central role the 
preference for liquidity plays in macroeconomics. In spite of this, no theoretical characterisation of 
this fundamental property has been yet provided. 
In conclusion, the concept of liquidity preference is connected to problems precisely stated in 
different economic contexts, namely: the problem of capital allocation, traditionally solved with the 
aid  of  tools  from  financial  economics;  the  determination  of  insurance  guaranty  funds,  for  which 
actuarial methods are provided; and finally, the conduction of monetary policy and the estimation of 
the money demand, for which linear models and statistical inference are used. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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The deregulation policies worldwide implemented and gradually deepened during the last thirty 
years have blurred the distinction between banks, financial intermediaries and insurance companies, 
and have made the economy more sensible to the fluctuations of the whole financial system. 
Such state of affairs shows the need of developing a unified framework for the characterisation 
of  liquidity preference, or to  put  in more ambitious terms, it  indicates  the need  of  enunciating  a 
general theory of liquidity. 
I  pretend  to  convince  the  reader  that  the  aim  can  be  accomplished  by  means  of  a  method 
routinely used in actuarial practice. The method leads to an optimal liquidity principle, which is easy 
to  implement,  and  which  can  be  naturally  aggregated  to  account  for  the  behaviour  of  financial 
conglomerates, holdings, industries and the economy as a whole. 
 
3. Borrowing Restrictions in Capital Markets 
According to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition, rational investors demand no cash 
provisions, for they are costly and do not affect the market value of aggregate portfolios. The theorem 
is a consequence of the hypothesis that in perfect markets financial securities and cash balances can be 
traded at any moment and without quantity restrictions. Then individuals can always remove the 
imbalances in their portfolios, for they can always borrow and lend any amount of capital at a fixed 
level of the interest rate. 
However, financial firms and private investors do face borrowing restrictions in practice. As a 
matter of fact, lenders charge premiums on loans depending on the credit quality of their counterparts. 
Such premiums are incremented with borrowers’ leverage ratios. 
Borrowing restrictions are likely to appear in markets with information asymmetries, which may 
arise from two different sources: agency costs between shareholders and managers, and the moral-
hazard implicit in the contracts established by firms with their customers. 
The  problems  caused  by  agency  costs  include  mismanagement  and  under-performance 
appearing when stockholders cannot fully observe the actions taken by managers  or when due to 
institutional rigidities they cannot promptly react to reverse undesired results. It can be also the case 
that managers behave poorly from the point of view of stockholders because they pursue strategies 
that  maximise  their  own  interest.  This  situation  may  be  especially  severe  in  companies  where 
incentives are not properly established [see e.g. Fama, (1980), Tobin, (1982b), Barnea et al., (1981), 
Jensen, (1986), and Merton and Perold, (1993)]. 
Moral-hazard, on the other hand, is induced by the fact that the portfolios held by financial 
institutions  are  not  observed  by  their  customers,  who  are  thus  unable  to  effectively  assess  the 
probability that their deposits will be returned in due time. As stated by Merton (1997), financial firms 
tend to be opaque institutions [see also Ross, (1989)]. 
Averse-to-risk  customers  will  accordingly  show  preference  for  guaranteed  deposits. 
Institutional guaranties usually take the form of cash holdings - to be delivered in case of default - that 
can be reinforced by a warrant issued by another institution or some governmental division, whose 
capacity and willingness to pay are beyond question. In other words, averse-to-risk customers agree to 
make deposits only if they are at least partially insured [see also Merton and Bodie, (1992)]. 
Merton (1974, 1977 and 1978) demonstrates that providing deposit insurance is equivalent to 
issue a put option on the value of the aggregate portfolio. The cost of deposit insurance can then be 
explicitly stated in terms of the volatility (i.e. the standard deviation) of the series of capital returns of 
the underlying portfolio. 
But the hypothesis of continuous trading is also required in the derivation of the option pricing 
formula  [Black  and  Scholes,  (1973)].  In  fact,  if  individuals  can  modify  the  composition  of  their 
portfolios at any moment, cash holding strategies can be always replicated by issuing and exchanging 
option  contracts.  In  other  words,  hedging,  capital  cushions  and  deposit  insurance  are  all  perfect 
substitutes in the absence of borrowing restrictions. 
The  presence  of  borrowing  restrictions  is  then  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  non-standarised 
policies are normally traded in insurance markets, which are assigned different prices depending on 
the information owned by the insurer and insured parties [see e.g. Venter, (1991), Wang et al., (1997), 
and Goovaerts et al., (2005)]. 
A new framework for the pricing of deposit insurance that effectively incorporates the presence 
of borrowing restrictions will be presented in the following section. Volume IV/ Issue 2(8)/ Summer 2009 
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4. The Optimal Liquidity Principle 
As stated by Tobin (1958), the problem of liquidity-preference is exclusively concerned with 
the determination of optimal combinations of risk and cash holdings. 
More precisely, Tobin analyses the behaviour of a certain representative decision-maker who 
holds some aggregate exposure X and a cash balance that can be lent at the interest rate r. Assuming 
that the underlying risk X is described by a Gaussian probability distribution and that both capital and 
securities can be traded without restrictions (in such a way that every combination of risk and cash can 
be attained by performing market operations), he demonstrates that the locus of efficient combinations 
of  risk  and  cash  is  represented  by  a  straight  line  in  the  plane  of  expected  returns  and  standard 
deviations. 
If  additionally  the  preferences  of  the  representative  decision-maker  regarding  the  different 
combined portfolios is characterised by a certain utility function (measuring the level of satisfaction 
that he or she obtains from the wealth produced by portfolios), every level of utility determines an 
indifference curve in the plane of expected returns and standard deviations. 
Hence  the  optimal  portfolio  containing  risk  and  cash  holdings  is  characterised  by  the 
combination  in  the  line  of  efficient  portfolios  that maximises  the  expected  utility  (defined  in the 
mathematical sense) of the representative decision-maker. The optimal portfolio is thus determined at 
the point where the rate of variation of the expected return with respect to the standard deviation is 
equal to the marginal utility of substituting a unit of expected return by an additional unit of standard 
deviation [see equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.7) in the paper of Tobin, (1958)]. 
A  necessary  condition  to  guarantee  the  existence  of  the  optimal  portfolio  is  that  the 
representative  decision-maker  shows  aversion-to-risk.  On  these  grounds,  Tobin  regards  liquidity 
preference as behaviour towards risk. 
Within this context, the method of Tobin determines an optimal liquidity principle, which can 
be applied to describe the demand for liquidity under conditions of perfect competition. This method 
has been actually used to derive an expression for the money demand [see e.g. Holsmtrom and Tirole, 
(2000), Lucas, (2000), and Choi and Oh, (2003)]. 
A similar procedure can be followed to obtain a liquidity principle that explicitly incorporates 
the condition of restricted borrowing. 
Indeed, notice that if X and  λ  respectively represent the percentage return of the underlying 
portfolio of securities and the proportion of funds invested in cash holdings, then the loss afforded at 
the end of the investment period (per unit of investment) can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) λ λ + − = + − X X , 0 min                           (1) 
 
The burden of bankruptcy can be transferred to some insurance  company provided that the 
insured party pays the actuarial price of the claim, equal to the expected value of the excess of loss 
[see Goovaerts et al., (1984)]. Rational decision-makers must then choose the proportion of cash that 
minimises the cost of insurance plus the opportunity cost of capital: 
 
( ) [ ] λ λ θ
λ ⋅ + + − r X E Min                           (2) 
 
where θ  denotes a parameter representing the expectations of the decision-maker. 
The solution to the optimisation problem of Equation (2) is determined at the point where the 
marginal reduction in the insurance price, equal to the probability of default, is equal to the marginal 
cost of capital r, i.e.: 
 
( ) { } r X P T X = − < =
∗ ∗
− λ λ θ θ,                           (3) 
 
The optimal proportion of cash is thereby characterised by an optimal exchange between a 
certain (non-random) cash flow and a flow of probability. A well-defined liquidity demand function is 
obtained in this way, which is always inversely related to the level of the interest rate, for the inverse 
probability function is always inversely related to its argument: Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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∗ = θ λ                             (4) 
 
A general theory of capital can be built on the grounds of Equation (4), which naturally extends 
the theoretical frameworks of the Modigliani-Miller proposition and the model of deposit insurance of 
Robert Merton [see Mierzejewski, (2008a)]. The rule can be applied to derive both centralised and 
decentralised mechanisms to allocate capital within financial conglomerates [Mierzejewski, (2006) 
and (2008b)]. 
More generally, the principle can be used to characterise the money demand of the economy 
and the monetary equilibrium. A theoretical basis is provided in this way to analyse the effect of 
monetary interventions in economies where individuals face borrowing restrictions. 
Finally,  the  principle  can  be  also  applied  to  characterise  the  demand  for  cash  balances  in 
markets of short-term (interbank) loans. The market cost of capital (as determined by the market 
equilibrium)  is  then  explicitly  dependent  on  the  statistical  description  of  risks  and  the  aggregate 
amounts of supplied and demanded balances. 
 
5. At the Corporate Level 
The problem of Equation (2) represents the trade-off faced by a decision-maker who has to 
decide between establishing an insurance contract (and paying the corresponding actuarial premium) 
on the one hand, and relying on borrowing and lending (at the interest rate r) in some market of loans 
on the other. 
Within multidivisional corporations, the necessity of keeping divisional cash holdings induces a 
loss at the aggregate level that can be measured explicitly. 
Indeed,  let  n X X , , 1 K   and  n λ λ , , 1 K   respectively  denote  the  risks  and  cash  proportions 
maintained by the divisions of some financial conglomerate, and let  X  and λ  respectively denote the 
risk and the cash proportion maintained at the aggregate level. Therefore, if  n ω ω , , 1 K  represent the 
proportions of funds invested in divisions (with respect to the total amount of funds invested by the 
conglomerate), then the following inequality holds: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ∑
=
− − + ⋅ ≤ +
n
i
i i i X E X E
1
λ ω λ θ θ                         (5) 
 
Therefore, as long as capital reserves are held at the divisional level  instead of maintaining a single 
aggregate balance at the headquarters of the conglomerate  central managers are obliged to minimise the sum 
of the insurance prices of the divisional claims, and not the insurance price of the aggregate claim, as would be 
their first choice: 
 










                           (6) 
 
An optimal centralised allocation of capital is obtained in this way, which assigns the same cash 
proportions preferred by divisions when acting as stand-alone independent units, i.e.: 
 
( ) n i r T
i X i , , 1
1




θ λ                            (7) 
 
Information asymmetries and differences in the attitude toward risk lead to discrepancies in the 
estimations  of  the  informational  parameter  θ   proposed  by  central  and  divisional  managers.  The 
optimal cash proportions determined by the centralised allocation of Equation (7) are thus expected to 
differ from the cash proportions that divisional managers would choose if they were allowed to decide 
independently. Volume IV/ Issue 2(8)/ Summer 2009 
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An optimal decentralised mechanism can be implemented that leads to the same level of capital 
collected by the centralised allocation at the aggregate level, but which additionally allows central 
managers to measure the internal differences between the informational parameters. 
The  optimal  decentralised  mechanism  is  implemented  in  the  following  way.  First  central 
managers determine the internal price of capital and let subsidiaries to choose their cash proportions. 
Divisions are only allowed to invest their reserves at a current account contracted with the central 
administration. By comparing the actual cash proportions chosen by subsidiaries with the amounts 
obtained when applying the centralised allocation of Equation (7), central managers can estimate the 
aversion parameters of divisional managers [Mierzejewski, (2006) and (2008b)]. 
 
6. The Monetary Equilibrium 
A fundamental macroeconomic relationship, already suggested by Keynes in his 
General Theory [1936, see the chapter devoted to the psychological and business incentives to 
liquidity; see also Keynes, (1937a), (1937b)], is the one relating the total stock of money M to 
the level of nominal output Y and interest rates [see e.g. Equation (6) in Friedman, (1970)]: 
 
( ) ( ) r Py r Y M λ λ ⋅ = ⋅ =                            (8) 
 
where P and y respectively denote the level of prices and real output, and where  ( ) r λ  represents the 
preference for liquidity of the economy  i.e. the proportion of output that people maintain in the 
form cash holdings. 
According to Equation (8), altering the money stock M necessarily implies that at least some of 
the variables P, y or r must change in order to preserve the monetary equilibrium. Consequently, if the 
rate of change of the level of prices (i.e. the rate of inflation) and the rate of growth of real output were 
pegged to some predetermined levels, the monetary authority would be always able to induce some 
preferred level of the interest rate by supplying the right amount of money to the economy. 
The efficacy of the mechanism depends, however, on the flexibility of prices and the sensibility 
of the liquidity-preference function  ( ) r λ  with respect to the interest rate. 
Indeed, if the liquidity-preference function were perfectly elastic with respect to the interest 
rate, then every variation in the amount of money would be completely absorbed by changes in the 
amount of balances held by the public  no matter the degree of price flexibility. Liquidity-preference 
is said to be absolute in this situation [see e.g. Tobin, (1947), (1972)]. By contrast, if prices were 
flexible and the liquidity-preference function was perfectly inelastic, then any variation in the money 
stock  would induce price  adjustments  in the short-run  and output adjustments  in  the  long-run 
[Friedman, (1966), (1970), (1971)]. 
Big controversy has arisen over this issue among economists, due to the consequences to the 
effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  in  stimulating  national  output  and  reducing  unemployment. 
Researchers and policy makers have been accordingly divided into two different schools: Keynesians 
or supporters of fiscal interventions on the one hand, and monetarists on the other [see e.g. Modigliani, 
(1977), and Tobin, (1981), (1993)]. 
In fact, assuming that the preference for liquidity is absolute (or nearly so) Keynesians conclude 
that money plays no role in the determination of the monetary equilibrium and hence, that only fiscal 
spending can stimulate the economy to attain full employment. This result can be formally obtained in 
a context of general equilibrium with the help of the Hicksian IS-LM model [see Tobin, (1947), (1972) 
and (1982a), and also Blanchard, (2005), for a presentation of the IS-LM model]. 
Monetarists alternatively claim that monetary policy does indeed affect real output. In reaching 
this conclusion, they assume that the opposite hypotheses hold, namely, that prices are flexible and 
liquidity-preference is non-absolute  in such a way that variations in the money stock are only 
partially absorbed by changes in the balances held at the aggregate level. Price adjustments are then 
expected  to  follow  money  stock  variations  in  the  short-run.  As  a  consequence,  production  and 
spending can be encouraged in the short-run by increasing the amount of money in the economy. In 
the long-run, prices return to their original levels, but at a higher level of real output. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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For this mechanism to work efficiently, the growth rate of prices must be pegged to some fixed 
level. On these grounds, monetarists claim that the major concern of governments must be the rate of 
inflation [Friedman,  (1968),  (1970), (1971)]    and  not  the  levels  of  output and  employment,  as 
suggested by Keynessians. 
A  major  issue  behind  the  monetary  controversy  is  then  the  empirical  assumption  over  the 
elasticity of the liquidity-preference function with respect to the interest rate. 
Let us investigate how the monetary equilibrium is determined when the preference for liquidity 
of the economy is characterised by the optimal liquidity principle of Equation (4). 
Notice in the first place that if the series of capital returns of national output is described by a 
Gaussian probability  distribution  with  mean return      and standard deviation  σ   and  people are 
neutral  to  risk  (in  such  a  way  that  distorted  are  equal  to  non-distorted  expectations,  i.e. 
[ ] [ ] X E X E = θ ,  X ∀ ) then the liquidity principle explicitly depends on the risk-parameters: 
 
( ) ( )   σ λ σ   − − Φ ⋅ =
− r r 1
1
,                 (9) 
 
where  Φ denotes the cumulative probability distribution of a standard Gaussian random variable, 
whose mean return and standard deviation are respectively equal to zero and one. 
Replacing Equation (9) into Equation (8) leads to the following alternative characterisation of 
the monetary equilibrium: 
 
( ) [ ]   σ − − Φ ⋅ ⋅ =
− r Py M 1
1                 (10) 
 
Within this setting, the monetary equilibrium not only depends on the level of prices, real output 
and interest rates, but also on the risk-parameters    and σ  describing the series of percentage returns 
of nominal output. Accordingly, even if the rate of change of the level of prices is pegged to a fixed 
inflation target, the monetary authority cannot set the interest rate by simply controlling the money 
supply M. 
The  conclusion  is  that  neither  fiscal  nor  monetary  policy  can  be  used  alone  to  induce  the 
economy to some predetermined equilibrium. 
Furthermore, recall that the effects of monetary interventions over the monetary equilibrium can 
be assessed in terms of the sensibility or semi-elasticity of the demand for cash holdings with respect 
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η                            (12) 
 
Hence the semi-elasticity function may well be equal to infinite in some cases, or in other 
words,  the  preference  for  liquidity  of  the  economy  may  well  become  absolute  under  certain 
circumstances. Actually, 
 





1                             (13) 
 
The states of the economy when this condition is satisfied are thereby regarded as critical states. 
Therefore, although the semi-elasticity function does indeed remain stable over a broad set of 
combinations of the variables M, P, y, r,     and σ , or in other words, although the economy can be Volume IV/ Issue 2(8)/ Summer 2009 
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well represented by the monetarist paradigm within a wide class of sates, the economy can also evolve 
to states where Keynesian fears are confirmed and liquidity-preference becomes absolute. 
As a conclusion, albeit monetary policy can sometimes effectively stimulate national output, it 
can become suddenly ineffective if certain paths are followed by the economy. 
 
7. Efficient Markets and Liquidity Crises 
Let M and L respectively denote the total supply of credit to a certain market of balances and 
the amount of funds invested on risk. 
The equilibrium in the market of loans is attained when aggregate outflows and inflows of 
capital are equalised. The following relationship thereby describes the market equilibrium when the 
series of capital returns of the market portfolio follows a Gaussian probability distribution: 
 
( ) r L M σ   λ , ⋅ =                             (14) 
 
Within this context, the discount factor  ( ) r σ   λ ,  explicitly represents the rate at which a unit of 
investment in the market portfolio is exchanged by a unit of capital, i.e. it represents the market price 
of risk, whilst the interest rate r represents the return accrued by a unit of capital invested in the market 
portfolio  or the internal rate of return on risk. 
Variations in the credit supply M and the amount of funds L spent on securities produce two 
kind of adjustments in Equation (14): adjustments in the price of capital r, and adjustments in the 
market price of risk that affect the risk-parameters     and σ . In other words, the equilibrium in the 
market of balances simultaneously determines the equilibrium in two markets, the market of capital 
and the market of financial securities. 
Two major consequences of the model must be emphasised. In the first place, notice that, from 
Equation (12), in Gaussian markets the semi-elasticity function η  takes positive values under some 
combinations of the interest rate and the risk-parameters. This means that under certain circumstances 
individuals prefer to lend all their balances  and do not maintain cash reserves at all. 
More  precisely,  we  can  state  that  people  maintain  reserves  only  when  the  condition 
( ) 0 1
1 > − − Φ
− σ   r  is satisfied. If instead  ( ) 0 1
1 ≤ − − Φ
− σ   r , individuals prefer to exclusively 
rely on capital markets. 
The second major consequence is related to the fact that the magnitude of the semi-elasticity of 
the demand for balances is equal to infinite in those states when  ( ) 0 1
1 = − − Φ
− σ   r . People are 
willing to substitute all their risky assets for cash holdings under such circumstances. These can be 
regarded  as  critical states  of  capital markets,  which can be  corresponded to  episodes of liquidity 
crises. Most notably, such critical states can be produced in the middle of a bullish trend  i.e. when 
the mean return of the market portfolio is greater than zero. 
Although the possibility of the spontaneous appearance of liquidity crises in the model confirms 
a well-known and documented fact, it contradicts one fundamental paradigm that has determined the 
economic policies of many countries during the last quarter of century, namely, the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
Recall that the efficient market hypothesis, proposed by Eugene Fama (1970, 1998), states that 
the prices at which securities are actually traded reflect all the available (and relevant) information. In 
other words, it claims that financial securities are always transacted at a fair price. As a consequence, 
it is impossible to beat or outperform markets, and hence, in particular, every kind of regulations and 
trading restrictions can only induce markets to inefficiently allocate resources. 
Due  to  the  efficient  market  hypothesis,  many  scholars  have  convinced  themselves  that  if 
liquidity crises are observed, they still correspond to the most efficient state. Others have claimed that 
liquidity crises provide evidence that people do not behave rationally and hence, that deregulated 
markets do not always arrive to the most efficient equilibrium. This assumption is especially appealing, 
for  according  to  another  major  economic  principle,  market  prices  necessarily  reflect  economic 
fundamentals  and it is difficult to accept that sudden contractions of the credit supply are the 
reflection of economic fundamentals. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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From the model of equilibrium described by Equation (14), a different conclusion is obtained. 
Indeed, notice in the first place that every state of the market, including those states related to liquidity 
crisis - when the semi-elasticity function η  is equal to infinite - represents the decisions taken by 
rational  individuals,  who  pursue  strategies  that  minimise  the  total  cost  of  guaranteeing  their 
underlying security portfolios, as stated in Equation (2). Within this context, liquidity crises provide 
no evidence of irrationality. 
However, the fact that Equation (14) allows multiple combinations of transacted capital flows 
and interest rates, which are determined by the risk-parameters     and σ , implies that rationality and 
deregulation  are  not  sufficient  conditions  to  ensure  that  markets  behave  efficiently.  Within  this 
theoretical setting, governments and regulatory authorities must induce markets (through persuasion 
and mandatory statements) to attain those states that are compatible with some predetermined level of 
economic performance. 
We thus arrive to one of the main  consequences of the model of  equilibrium described by 
Equation (14), namely, that the deregulation of financial markets is not necessarily compatible with 
financial stability and sustainable economic growth. 
 
8. Comparative Advantages of the Model and Some Comments on its Implementation 
An appealing characteristic of the model presented in this paper is its exclusive dependence on 
observable variables, namely: the amount of money supplied by the central bank and the level of 
national output, as  stated in Equation (10), or alternatively, the  amount of funds spent on capital 
reserves and risky securities, as stated in Equation (14); the level of the opportunity cost of capital, and 
finally, the expected return and the standard deviation of the series of percentage variations of the 
level of income. This implies that the liquidity principle of Equation (9) can be effectively applied to 
describe the liquidity demand in any of the economic contexts previously proposed. 
Firstly,  at  the  corporate  level,  the  principle  can  be  regarded  as  an  extension  to  the  capital 
principle proposed by Merton and Perold (1993, see the technical appendix): 
 
T
MP σ λ ⋅ = 4 . 0                            (15) 
 
Then the principle of Merton and Perold represents a straight line in the plane of volatilities and 
capital proportions, which always intercepts the origin and has a constant slope. The principle of 
Equation (9) also represents a straight line in the plane of volatilities and capital proportions, though 
its intercept and slope are respectively determined by the expected return and the level of the interest 
rate. Consequently, a broader range of patterns can be described with the principle of Equation (9) 
than with the principle of Merton and Perold. In particular, some scenarios are possible  with the 
principle of Equation (9), when the slope of the capital line tends to infinite, i.e. when decision-makers 
are  willing  to  exchange  any  amount  of  capital  in  response  to  an  infinitesimally  small  volatility 
movement  [Mierzejewski, (2008a)]. 
Within the more general context of the determination of the liquidity preference of individuals, 
the superiority of the principle of Equation (9) over the liquidity principle of James Tobin (1958) is 
demonstrated by the fact that while the former explicitly determines the preferred amount of liquidity 
provisions as a function of the interest rate, the method of Tobin only provides an implicit rule, which 
not always leads to a closed expression. 
Indeed, if the expected utility operator were used in Equation (2) to represent the price of the 
contract insuring the loss of the total portfolio  instead of the expected value of the excess of loss  
then the following equation would be obtained from the first order condition: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 ' = − − ⋅ − + ∫
−
∞ − r f u x dF x u X X λ λ
λ
                     (16) 
 
where  X F  and  X f  respectively denote the cumulative and the density probability function of the 
random variable X (representing the series of percentage returns of the total portfolio) and where u’ 
denotes  the  first  derivative  of  the  underlying    utility  function.  Hence  no  expression  is  obtained Volume IV/ Issue 2(8)/ Summer 2009 
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characterising the optimal liquidity principle  except for some restricted class of utility functions 
[see Chapter 2 in Mierzejewski, (2008b)]. 
As demonstrated, among others, by Lucas (2000), and Holmstrom and Tirole (2000), the utility 
maximisation approach provides a theoretical basis to derive expressions for the money demand. 
As stated by Lucas (2000), such demand functions can be associated with semi-log and log-log 
specifications  that  are  well  known  in  macroeconomics.  With  the  aid  of  these  specifications,  the 
observed patterns of real balances and interest rates can be satisfactorily explained. Lucas makes use 
of this theoretical framework to produce estimations of the gains obtained from reducing inflation. 
The model of Lucas, however, depends on various specific assumptions about the economy and 
householders’ behaviour  and also on some non-observable parameters. Besides, Lucas regards the 
money demand function as a steady equilibrium relation, which is accordingly associated with long-
term fundamentals, not suited to account for short-term fluctuations. 
Semi-log  and  log-log  representations  of  the  money  demand  can  be  also  obtained  from  the 
liquidity principle of Equation (7), as long as the series of output percentage returns is respectively 
assumed to follow  Exponential and  Pareto  probability  distributions  [Mierzejewski, (2008a)].  This 
means that the model proposed in this paper can be naturally integrated with the existing literature of 
monetary economics. Moreover, it requires of much fewer assumptions than the model of Lucas, and 
since it is explicitly formulated in terms of short-term output variations, it can effectively describe the 
effect of short-term contracts in capital markets. 
In other words, although both the model of Lucas and the model proposed in this paper lead to 
the same (semi-log and log-log) functional relationships of the money demand, in the former setting 
the underlying parameters exclusively depends on long-term fundamentals, whilst in the later, they 
may depend both on long-term fundamentals and short-term fluctuations (a more detailed discussion 
on the subject can be found in Chapter 2 in Mierzejewski, 2008b). 
Holmstrom  and  Tirole  (2000),  on  the  other  hand,  use  the  utility  maximisation  approach  to 
derive the demand for liquidity of corporations faced to borrowing restrictions, which is similar from a 
broad perspective to the model proposed in this paper. Their model, however, requires of much more 
and stronger hypothesis. 
Firstly, in the model of Holmstrom and Tirole (2000) individuals only invest in projects with 
constant returns to scale. Uncertainty is then introduced as the probability of success of the project, 
while  moral-hazard  is  represented  by  the  effort  that  managers  exert  to  take  better  investment 
decisions. Notice that in this way both uncertainty and moral-hazard are measured by means of non-
observable  variables.  Additionally,  borrowers  and  lenders  are  assumed  to  be  neutral  to  risk,  and 
lenders obtain zero profit  i.e. they act in a competitive environment. 
Finally, liquidity shocks are introduced in the model as exogenous events that affect the total 
benefit accrued by the conglomerate. The magnitude of the shock is distributed according to some 
probability distribution. 
In the model proposed in this paper, by contrast, only observable variables intervene. Thus, 
uncertainty is associated with the randomness of the series of output variations, while moral-hazard is 
explicitly measured by the level of raised capital  on the grounds of a deposit insurance contract 
celebrated by the conglomerate with some insurance company [Mierzejewski, (2008a)]. 
Within this context, as explained in details in Section 7, liquidity shocks are endogenous events, 
interpreted  as  physical  adjustments  produced  in  markets  with  rational  investors    who  seek  to 
minimise  their  total  exposure.  Liquidity  shocks  are  thus  corresponded  to  certain  critical  states 
characterised by certain combinations of the risk parameters and the interest rate. The aversion-to-risk 
of decision-makers plays thus no determinant role in the formation of liquidity crises, although it can 
exacerbate its effects under certain circumstances [see Chapter 3 in Mierzejewski, (2008b)]. 
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated that the new theoretical setting presented in this paper 
  for  the  characterisation  of  the  demand  for  liquidity    can  reproduce  many  of  the  results 
traditionally  obtained  by  means  of  the  utility  maximisation  approach.  Besides,  since  fewer 
assumptions are required in the new theoretical framework, and only closed expressions are obtained, 
which exclusively depend on observable variables, we can regard the new approach as a superior 
alternative, both from the point of view of its theoretical and empirical possibilities. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
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9. Conclusions 
A general theoretical framework has been presented to characterise the demand for liquidity in 
different economic contexts. 
The major hypothesis advanced in the paper is that people do face borrowing restrictions in 
capital  markets.  Then  individuals  holding  assets  with  random  outputs  are  exposed  to  imbalances 
produced by contingent claims that are transacted in some market of deposit insurance. 
The model provides a common base to describe the capital needs of consumers, firms, private 
investors and financial conglomerates, as well as the aggregate balance demanded by industries and 
the economy as a whole. Hence, it can be applied both at the corporate and macroeconomic level. 
A  unified  theory  of  liquidity  is  thus  obtained,  which  effectively  fuses  financial  economics, 
macroeconomics and actuarial science. 
Episodes of liquidity crises, which lack an explanation at the light of classic economic theory 
(influenced  by  the  paradigm  of  perfect  competition  and  the  efficient  markets  hypothesis),  are 
meaningful within the new theoretical setting. 
 
10. References 
[1] Barnea, A., Haugen, R.A. and Senbet, L.W., (1981), An Equilibrium Analysis of Debt Financing 
Under Costly Tax Arbitrage and Agency Problems, in: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 36 (3), pp. 
569-581. 
[2] Black, F. and Scholes, M.J., (1973), The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, in: Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 81 (3), pp. 637-654. 
[3] Blanchard, O., (2005), Macroeconomics, Prentice Hall. 
[4] Choi, W.G. and Oh, S., (2003), A Money Demand Function with Output Uncertainty, Monetary 
Uncertainty, and Financial Innovations, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 35 (5), 
pp. 685-709. 
[5] Fama, E., (1970), Efficient Capital Markets: a Review of Theory and Empirical Work, in: Journal 
of Finance Vol. 25 (2), pp. 383-417. 
[6] Fama, E., (1980), Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, in: Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 88 (2), pp. 288-307. 
[7] Fama, E., (1998), Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns and Behavioural Finance, in: Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 283-306. 
[8]  Friedman,  M.,  (1966),  Interest  Rates  and  the  Demand  for  Money,  in:  Journal  of  Law  and 
Economics, Vol. 9 (Oct. 1966), pp. 71-85. 
[9] Friedman, M.. (1968). The Role of Monetary Policy, in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 58 
(1), pp. 1-17. 
[10]  Friedman,  M.,  (1970),  A  Theoretical  Framework  for  Monetary  Analysis,  in:  The  Journal  of 
Political Economy, Vol. 78 (2), pp. 193-238. 
[11]  Friedman,  M.,  (1971),  A  Monetary  Theory  of  Nominal  Income,  in:  The  Journal  of  Political 
Economy Vol. 79 (2), pp. 323-337. 
[12] Goovaerts, M.J., Van Den Borre, E. and Laeven, R., (2005), Managing Economic and Virtual 
Economic Capital within Financial Conglomerates, in: North American Actuarial Journal, Vol. 9 
(3), pp. 77-89. 
[13] Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J., (2000), Liquidity and Risk Management, in: Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol. 32 (3), pp. 295-319. 
[14] Howells, P. and Bain, K., (2005), The Economics of Money, Banking and Finance, Prentice Hall. 
[15] Jensen, M.C., (1986), Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, in: 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (2), pp. 323-329 Volume IV/ Issue 2(8)/ Summer 2009 
  271 
[16]  Keynes,  J.M.,  (1936),  The  General  Theory  of  Employment,  Interest  and  Money,  London: 
Macmillan (reprinted 2007). 
[17]  Keynes,  J.M.,  (1937a),  The  General  Theory  of  Employment,  in:  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics Vol. 51 (2), pp. 209-223. 
[18] Keynes, J.M., (1937b), The Ex-Ante Theory of the Rate of Interest, in: The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 47 (188), pp. 663-669. 
[19] Lucas, R.E., (2000), Inflation and Welfare, in: Econometrica, Vol. 68 (2), pp. 247-274. 
[20] Merton, R.C., (1974), On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, in: 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 29 (2), pp. 449-470. 
[21]  Merton,  R.C.,  (1977),  An  Analytic  Derivation  of  the  Cost  of  Deposit  Insurance  and  Loan 
Guarantees:  an  Application  of  Modern  Option  Pricing  Theory,  in:  Journal  of  Banking  and 
Finance, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 3-11. 
[22] Merton, R.C., (1978), On the Cost of Deposit Insurance when there are Surveillance Costs, in: 
Journal of Business, Vol.  51 (3), pp. 439-452. 
[23] Merton, R.C., (1997), A Model of Contract Guarantees for Credit-Sensitive, Opaque Financial 
Intermediaries, in: European Finance Review, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 1-13. 
[24] Merton, R.C. and Bodie, Z., (1992), On the Management of Financial Guarantees, in: Financial 
Management, Vol. 21 (4), pp. 87-109. 
[25] Merton, R.C. and Perold, A.F., (1993), Theory of Risk Capital in Financial Firms, in: Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 16-32. 
[26] Mierzejewski, F., (2006), Optimal Capital Allocation Confronting Bankruptcy and Agency Costs, 
in: Bank- en Financiewezen, Vol. 2006 (2), pp. 72-77. 
[27] Mierzejewski, F., (2008a), The Economic Capital of Opaque Financial Institutions, in: Journal of 
Applied Economic Sciences, Vol. 3 (Issue 3, Number 5), pp. 232-245. 
[28]  Mierzejewski,  F.,  (2008b),  Essays  on  Liquidity-Preference  in  Markets  with  Borrowing 
Restrictions.  Ph.D.  Thesis.  Katholieke  Universiteit  Leuven.  Available  at 
https://repository.libis.kuleuven.be/dspace/handle/1979/2006 
[29] Modigliani, F., (1977), The Monetary Controversy or, Should We Forsake Stabilization Policies?, 
in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 67 (2), pp. 1-19. 
[30]  Modigliani,  F.  and Miller,  M.H., (1958),  The Cost  of  Capital,  Corporation  Finance and  the 
Theory of Investment, in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 48 (3), pp. 261-297. 
[31] Ross, S.A., (1989), Institutional Markets, Financial Marketing, and Financial Innovation, in: The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 44 (3), pp. 541-556. 
[32]  Tobin,  J.,  (1947),  Liquidity  Preference  and  Monetary  Policy,  in:  The  Review  of  Economic 
Statistics, Vol. 29 (2), pp. 124-131. 
[33] Tobin, J., (1958), Liquidity Preference as Behaviour towards Risk, in: The Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 25 (2), pp. 65-86. 
[34] Tobin, J., (1972), Friedman’s Theoretical Framework, in: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
80 (5), pp. 852-863. 
[35] Tobin, J., (1981), The Monetarist Counter-Revolution Today  an Appraisal, in: The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 91 (361), pp. 29-42. 
[36] Tobin, J., (1982a), Money and Finance in the Macroeconomic Process, in: Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol. 14 (2), pp. 171-204. 
[37]  Tobin,  J.,  (1982b),  The  Commercial  Banking  Firm:  a  Simple  Model,  in:  The  Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 84 (4), pp. 495-530. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences  
  272 
[38] Tobin, J., (1993), Business Cycles and Economic Growth: Current Controversies about Theory 
and Policy, in: Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 47 (3), pp. 33-47. 
[39] Venter, G., (1991), Premium Calculation Implications of Reinsurance without Arbitrage, in: Astin 
Bulletin, Vol. 21 (2), pp. 223-230. 
[40] Wang, S., Young, V. and Panjer, H., (1997), Axiomatic Characterization of Insurance Prices, in: 
Insurance:  Mathematics  and  Economics,  Vol.  21  (2),  pp.  173-183. Volume IV/ Issue 2(8)/ Summer 2009      
 
  273 
 